On "Mental Events" (1970) and "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963), w/ guest Chris Heath. When we talk about mental events (e.g. desires) causing physical occurrences (an action to obtain what is desired), are we giving a causal picture in the scientific sense, which would rule out free will? Or are reason-giving and causality just different language games? Get more at <a href= "https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/">partiallyexaminedlife.com</a>. Visit <a href="https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/support" target= "_blank" rel="noopener">partiallyexaminedlife.com/support</a> to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion. Sponsor: Every self-made person started somewhere. Yours starts free at <a href="https://shopify.com/pel" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">shopify.com/pel</a>. Learn about Mark's fall philosophy of mind class at <a title="" href= "https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/class.">partiallyexaminedlife.com/class</a>.

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Ep. 398: Donald Davidson on Mind vs. Body (Part One)

The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

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