On The Concept of Mind (1949), Ch. 6, "Self-Knowledge." Ryle is arguing against a Cartesian take on mind that he sees as over-intellectualizing. In this case, it is not the case that every conscious act is itself an object of an act of consciousness: Not all consciousness is self-conscious, and introspection itself must involve a layer of mentality (the act of self-consciousness) that is not itself the object of an act of consciousness. <a href= "https://www.anandsweb.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/concept-of-mind.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Read along with us</a>, starting on p. 136 (PDF p. 199). Subscribe to Closereads at <a href= "https://www.patreon.com/c/closereadsphilosophy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy</a>; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get subsequent parts to this and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at <a href="https://www.patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife" target= "_blank" rel="noopener">patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife</a> for a nice combo deal.)

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PEL Presents Closereads: Gilbert Ryle on Self-Knowledge (Part One)

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