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Since March 2022, it has been harder to buy an iPhone in Russia, because Apple chose to stop selling there. So did Prada, Renault, Starbucks, Nike and more than 1,000 other firms. These private sanctions added to the official sanctions imposed by 45 countries.Beata Javorcik (EBRD, Oxford, CEPR) and her co-authors wanted to know if private sanctions did anything more than generate good headlines. To do this, they matched millions of Russian customs records to the trademarks on the goods, so they could tell an iPhone from a Samsung phone and a Gucci scarf from a Gucci bag. Would imports of goods under voluntary sanctions stop? Would the brands cheat? Would importers find an other way to get goods into the country through the back door? She tells Tim Phillips what private sanctions on Russia have achieved.The research behind this episode:Chupilkin, Maxim, Beata Javorcik, Alexander Plekhanov, and Aleksandra Peeva. 2026. <a href="https://cepr.org/publications/dp21774">"Not Wearing Prada: Do Private Sanctions Reinforce Official Sanctions?"</a> CEPR Discussion Paper 21774. To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Beata Javorcik. 2026. "Not wearing Prada." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guest<a href="https://www.ebrd.com/home/who-we-are/our-organisation/ebrd-governance-leadership/ebrd-executive-committee/beata-javorcik.html#">Beata Javorcik</a> is Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on leave from the University of Oxford, where she is Professor of Economics and a Fellow of All Souls College. She is a Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the International Trade and Regional Economics programme. Her research spans foreign direct investment, shocks to production networks, trade under sanctions and the evasion of import duties.Research cited in this episodeOfficial sanctions on Russia. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, 45 economies, including the US, the EU and the UK, imposed sanctions on Russia. They cut selected Russian banks off from the SWIFT payment messaging system, immobilised the reserves of Russia's central bank, limited Russia's earnings from hydrocarbon exports and banned exports of arms, dual-use goods, advanced technology, industrial equipment and luxury goods. By the end of 2022, around 40% of product lines were at least partly covered. The luxury ban explains some odd entries. Ski suits and sports clothing priced above €300 are sanctioned, and champagne is banned while prosecco is not. Enforcement sits with several bodies: in the US, the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Commerce Department; in the EU, individual member states; in the UK, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation.Private sanctions and public opinion. Oliver Hart, David Thesmar and Luigi Zingales surveyed 2,915 Americans, a representative sample, in May and June 2022. Of these, 61% agreed that doing business in Russia is like being an accomplice to the war, and that firms should sever ties whatever the consequences. Javorcik raises the study to explain why firms with no legal obligation to leave Russia chose to go anyway: reputation, the threat of boycotts, pressure from investors, employees and business partners, and sometimes the values of managers. Hart, Oliver, David Thesmar, and Luigi Zingales. 2024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad041">"Private Sanctions."</a> Economic Policy 39 (117): 203-268."The business of business is business." The phrase is a popular summary of the view Milton Friedman set out in a 1970 essay in the New York Times Magazine, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." Hart and his co-authors found that only a minority of their respondents treated the decision to leave Russia as a purely commercial one.The Yale list. A team at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, led by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, has tracked what more than 1,500 major companies said about their Russian operations since the invasion. To qualify, a firm must have revenue above $100 million, be majority owned from outside Russia and Belarus, and have meaningful operations in its home country, in Russia and in at least one other country. The team grades firms from full withdrawal to "digging in," and keeps a separate record of firms that <a href="https://www.yalerussianbusinessretreat.com/">reneged on their promises to leave</a>. Javorcik and her co-authors use the list to classify the owners of 1,657 Western trademarks. Only 11 firms moved from strict private sanctions to doing little or nothing.Customs data with trademarks. The paper draws on transaction-level records of Russian imports from 2016 to 2023, about 12 million records in 2022 alone. Each record shows the product code, the value, the quantity, the trading partner and the trademark. The products are classified at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System, which has more than 5,600 categories. The trademark field contained more than 1.2 million spellings; the authors used a large language model to standardise them, which merged 600 versions of "Samsung" into one.Trade diversion through neutral countries. Countries that do not participate in sanctions, including China, Turkey and the UAE, do not monitor re-exports to Russia. After the invasion, the share of imports arriving via traders in these neutral jurisdictions rose by an additional 16 percentage points for brands whose owners announced private sanctions. The same authors traced a related route in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S001429212600084X">"The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia"</a> (Chupilkin, Javorcik, and Plekhanov 2026, European Economic Review).Tariff equivalent. Trade economists often express a barrier to trade as the ad valorem tariff, a tax set as a percentage of the value of the goods, that would cause the same fall in trade. On this measure, private sanctions against Russia equal a tariff of between 9% and 84%. The range is wide because the answer depends on the trade elasticity, which measures how strongly trade responds to a change in costs.The Clark Center Forum surveys. On <a href="https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/ukraine-2/">8 March 2022</a>, the Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets at Chicago Booth asked its panels of leading economists if the sanctions already in place would lead to a deep recession in Russia. Of the respondents, 93% of the US panel and 94% of the European panel agreed. A deep recession did not follow. In <a href="https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/sanctions/">June 2025</a>, a majority of the European panel agreed that, on the evidence of the past 10 years, Western-led economic sanctions do not substantially deter target countries. Javorcik, a panel member, agreed, citing trade diversion and sanctions circumvention.The UN vote. On 2 March 2022, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_cs">141 countries in the UN General Assembly</a> voted for a resolution that condemned Russia's invasion and demanded its withdrawal from Ukraine. Javorcik contrasts this with the 45 economies that impose sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on how many countries take part.More VoxTalks Economics episodes<a href="https://cepr.org/multimedia/do-sanctions-work">Do sanctions work?</a> Moritz Schularick takes the long view of the evidence on sanctions of every type, and asks if policymakers will impose the ones that bite.<a href="https://cepr.org/multimedia/trading-around-geopolitics">Trading around geopolitics</a> Giancarlo Corsetti, Banu Demir and Beata Javorcik on whether Turkish exporters filled the gap in the Russian market, and an earlier sighting of the balloon.<a href="https://cepr.org/multimedia/what-impact-have-trade-sanctions-had-russia">What impact have trade sanctions had on Russia?</a> Dzhamilya Nigmatulina uses railway shipments, company accounts and procurement records to measure what official trade sanctions did inside Russia.Related reading on VoxEU<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/beyond-mandated-sanctions-western-firms-voluntary-departure-russia">Beyond mandated sanctions: Western firms' voluntary departure from Russia</a>, a VoxEU column by Tetyana Balyuk and Anastassia Fedyk on how shareholder pressure drove Western firms out of Russia.<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/export-bans-werent-really-bans-how-russia-kept-importing-military-goods">Export bans that weren't really bans: How Russia kept importing military goods</a>, a VoxEU column by Lisa Scheckenhofer, Feodora Teti, David Torun and Joschka Wanner on the gaps, transit loopholes and third-country routes that kept military components flowing.<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-consequences-russias-invasion-ukraine-views-leading-economists">Economic consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Views of leading economists</a>, Romesh Vaitilingam's March 2022 report on the Clark Center survey that predicted a deep Russian recession.</div>

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