On "An Argument for the Identity Theory" (1966), which unlike U.T. Place who merely argued that minds could be brains, argues that minds must be brains, in all possible worlds. The argument appears functionalist: mental states are defined by their causal roles, and causality is naturally the realm of the physical, so mental causality makes most sense if it is a way of talking about physical causality. <a href="https://andrewmbailey.com/dkl/Identity_Theory.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Read along with us</a>. You can choose to <a href= "https://youtu.be/CAkdrGSca1A?si=wU_30UdaNuxOWJ8X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">watch this on video.</a> Subscribe to Closereads at <a href= "https://www.patreon.com/c/closereadsphilosophy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy</a>; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get part 2 and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at <a href= "https://www.patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife" target="_blank" rel="noopener">patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife</a> for a nice combo deal.)

Podurama

Home

Trending

Personal

Your Podcasts

New Episodes

My Files

Favourite Episodes

Tags (Folders)

Recently Played

Bookmarks

Followed Playlists

PEL Presents Closereads: David Lewis on Mind-Brain Identity (Part One)

The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

AI Chapters

AI Insights

Reviews